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ABSTRACT. This paper provides an alternative approach to the theory of dynamic pro-
gramming, designed to accommodate the kinds of recursive preference specifications
that have become popular in economic and financial analysis, while still supporting tra-
ditional additively separable rewards. The approach exploits the theory of monotone
convex operators, which turns out to be well suited to dynamic maximization. The intu-
ition is that convexity is preserved under maximization, so convexity properties found
in preferences extend naturally to the Bellman operator.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Through a combination of theory and analysis of observational and experimental data,
economists have constructed progressively more realistic representations of agents and
their choices. In the context of intertemporal choice, these preferences have come to
include such features as independent sensitivity to intertemporal substitution and in-
tratemporal risk (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1978) or Epstein and Zin (1989)), desire
for robustness (Hansen and Sargent (2008)), the impact of narrow framing (Barberis
et al. (2006), Barberis and Huang (2009)) and sensitivity to ambiguity (e.g., Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Schneider (2008), Klibanoff et al. (2009), Hayashi and
Miao (2011), Ju and Miao (2012), Strzalecki (2013)).
1This paper has benefitted from thoughtful comments by Yiannis Vailakis and Gaetano Bloise. Fi-
nancial support from ARC grant FT160100423 is gratefully acknowledged. guanlong.ren@anu.edu.au,
john.stachurski@anu.edu.au
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2While some of these models have found significant popularity in applied research,2 tra-
ditional additively separable preferences with linear certainty equivalents still form the
backbone of applied and quantitative work. This is partly due to the fact that optimal
choice in the traditional setting is much better understood (see, e.g., Bellman (1957) or
Blackwell (1965)). Specifications involving nonlinear recursive preferences have proved
harder to handle. While early attempts to treat nonlinear recursive preferences in a dis-
crete time dynamic programming framework used the contraction mapping arguments
that had proved successful for additively separable models (see, e.g., Lucas and Stokey
(1984)), it was soon realized that the Bellman operators generated by the most common
recursive preference specifications are not supremum norm contractions, implying that
the classical theory typified by Blackwell (1965) cannot be employed.3
This realization drove a second wave of theoretical analysis on dynamic programming
in the context of nonlinear recursive preferences, built instead around monotonicity and
concavity. For example, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) exploited monotonicity and
concavity to obtain a range of deep results on existence and uniqueness of recursive
utilities. Le Van et al. (2008) adapted the theory of monotone concave operators, as
pioneered by Krasnoselskii (1964) and coauthors, to dynamic programming problems.
Marinacci and Montrucchio (2017) and Bloise and Vailakis (2018) further extended these
ideas. Like contraction maps, under certain regularity conditions, monotone concave
operators have unique and globally attracting fixed points—a highly attractive property
in the context of dynamic programming.4
However, while we now have a good understanding of existence and uniqueness of
recursive utilities—that is, results showing that the preference specifications are well
defined at a fixed consumption path or policy—our understanding of optimality in the
2For example, the recursive preference specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) forms a core component
of the quantitative asset pricing literature, while also finding use in applications ranging from optimal
taxation to fiscal policy and business cycles. See, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen and Sargent
(2008) or Schorfheide et al. (2018).
3In addition to Lucas and Stokey (1984), related work can be found in Boyd (1990), Dura´n (2003), Le Van
and Vailakis (2005) and Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2007). It was Marinacci and Montruc-
chio (2010) who emphasized that sup norm contractivity fails for many economically reasonable aggrega-
tors, such as Thompson aggregators.
4This property was also used the show existence of Markov equilibria in the presence of distortions
in Datta et al. (2002), Morand and Reffett (2003) and several related papers. Additional results on ex-
istence and uniqueness of recursive utility via monotone concave operators can be found in Becker and
Rinco´n-Zapatero (2017). Alternative approaches that admit unbounded aggregators are studied in Rinco´n-
Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2007) and Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2013).
3context of recursive preferences is less complete. Despite important contributions, foun-
dations have been lacking for some of the most popular specifications for applied work,
such as certain empirically relevant parmeterizations of Epstein–Zin preferences, or the
narrow framing or ambiguity sensitive preferences discussed above.
In this paper we resolve several of these outstanding problems by developing a set of
sufficient conditions for abstract dynamic programs—including both additively separa-
ble and recursive preference models—that provide global convergence of the Bellman
operator to the value function and optimality of the associated policies. These condi-
tions are applied to a range of recursive preference specifications popular in applied
settings, including standard Epstein–Zin models with the constant elasticity of substi-
tution aggregators, risk-sensitive and robust control models, narrow framing models
and some kinds of ambiguity sensitive preferences. In each case we show that value
function iteration converges uniformly to the value function and that Bellman’s princi-
ple of optimality is valid.
Our approach builds on the monotone concave approach but with one significant dif-
ference: the relevant operators are convex. Put differently, we use monotone convex
operators to study the maximization problems associated with dynamic programming.
The main benefit is that, unlike concavity, convexity is preserved under the taking of
pointwise suprema. Hence convexity pairs naturally with maximization. Moreover,
under suitable conditions, monotone convex operators enjoy all the stability properties
possessed by monotone concave operators.
At the same time, we find that the theory of monotone concave operators is ideal for
minimization problems. This is because concavity is preserved by minimization, in the
sense that the infimum of a family of concave functions is concave. Thus, any concavity
inherent in the dynamic program flows naturally into the Bellman operator.
Finally, we note that simple continuous transformations can be used to transform inher-
ently concave problems into convex problems and vice versa. Through these transfor-
mations, one can shift between convex maximization problems and concave minimiza-
tion problems on a case by case basis. In particular, preference specifications that have
been recognized as concave can be modified so that they exhibit convexity rather than
concavity.
As one extension of our ideas, we also consider an Epstein–Zin recursive preference
model with unbounded rewards. Problems with unbounded rewards are difficult to
treat in a systematic way. Important innovations tailored to economic applications can
4be found in Dura´n (2003), Le Van and Vailakis (2005), Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-
Palmero (2007), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010) and Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018).
Perhaps the most common approach to treating unbounded rewards in the broader field
of dynamic programming has been one involving contraction mapping arguments in a
setting of weighted supremum norms (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2013)). Here we show that
similar ideas can be applied when contractivity fails or is difficult to obtain. In partic-
ular, we show how one of the results from the preceding sections can be adapted to
accommodate unbounded rewards.
One closely related studies to ours is Bloise and Vailakis (2018), who analyze dynamic
programming problems with bounded recursive utility. By exploiting the theory of
monotone concave operators, they provide valuable optimality results. We draw on
several key ideas and extend their analysis in multiple directions. These include devel-
oping an optimality theory for monotone convex operators, adopting transformations
that allow for the use of convex operator methods, and providing a treatment of several
sophisticated models used in recent quantitative work, including those with narrow
framing or ambiguity aversion.5
Another related paper is Guo and He (2017), who consider an extension to the Epstein-
Zin recursive utility model that includes utility measures for investment gains and
losses. As a part of their study, they obtain results for existence, uniqueness and suc-
cessive approximations of the solution to the Bellman equation for a portfolio selection
problem with gain-loss utility. They provide sharp results under the assumption that
the state space is finite and the exogenous state process is irreducible. Our results are
significantly broader, applying as they do to a large range of settings outside of portfolio
selection problem within the framework of Epstein and Zin (1989).
Also related is Balbus (2016), who considers a class of non-negative recursive utilities
with certain types of nonlinear aggregators and certainty equivalent operators, and
studies the corresponding dynamic programming problem. His results for existence,
uniqueness and convergence of solutions to recursive utilities and to the Bellman equa-
tion rest upon the theory of monotone α-concave operators. These results are valuable
5An alternative and related reference for the general theory of dynamic programming with recursive
preferences is Marinacci and Montrucchio (2017), which presents valuable new methods for determining
when isotone maps have unique fixed points.
5in some instances, although the requisite α-concave property does not hold for a num-
ber of popular specifications of recursive utility, such as those of Epstein and Zin (1989)
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution differs from unity.6
Ozaki and Streufert (1996) provide a comprehensive study of the recovery of recur-
sive preferences and the corresponding dynamic programming problem under a non-
Markovian environment. Their results are useful for studying dynamic programming
for non-additive stochastic objectives in a very general setting, although their assump-
tions also exclude some popular specifications.7
Our paper also has some connection to the recent work by Pavoni et al. (2018), who in-
troduce a recursive dual approach suitable for limited commitment problems or other
incentive-constrained programming problems. The authors construct a dual formula-
tion of the applications they consider, which is recursive and such that the dual Bell-
man operator is contractive under a Thompson-like metric. Their theory can handle
problems where preferences are specified via a general time aggregator and stochastic
aggregator. In the problems we consider below, forward looking constraints are absent
and we can directly consider the primal optimization problem. This allows us to avoid
certain assumptions used to tie the primal problem to the dual and obtain contractivity
on the dual side.
We note that our theoretical framework departs from the separate specification of ag-
gregator and certainty equivalent that has been popular in the economic literature since
Kreps and Porteus (1978). Instead we adopt the abstract dynamic programming frame-
work developed and collated by Bertsekas (2013). In abstract dynamic programming,
the most cohesive sufficient conditions are still driven by contractions or semi-contractive
properties (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2013), chapters 2–3). The monotone-convex and monotone-
concave results set out below offer an alternative branch of cohesive and broadly appli-
cable methods.
6See, e.g., page 8 of Balbus (2016), as well as the analogous discussion in Le Van et al. (2008).
7For example, with Epstein–Zin preferences and elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater than
one (as found in, say, Kaplan and Violante (2014)), the conditions of Theorem D fail, since the parameters
related to the variable discount factor δ¯ and δ are infinite. Recently, in a related study based on the bicon-
vergence technique, Bich et al. (2018) establish existence, uniqueness and computation of the solution to
the Bellman equation for deterministic dynamic programming problems under certain types of continuity
properties imposed on temporal aggregators.
6The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains our main results.
Section 3 has applications. Section 4 considers an extension (unbounded rewards).
Apart from some simple arguments, all proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. GENERAL RESULTS
Let X and A be separable metric spaces, called the state and action space respectively. Let
R
X represent all functions from X to R and let ‖ · ‖ denote the supremum norm on the
bounded functions in RX. For f and g in RX, the statement f 6 g means f (x) 6 g(x)
for all x ∈ X. Let Γ be a nonempty correspondence from X to A, referred to below as the
feasible correspondence. We understand Γ(x) as representing all actions available to the
controller in state x. The correspondence Γ in turn defines the set of feasible state-action
pairs
G := {(x, a) ∈ X× A : a ∈ Γ(x)}.
Let
• w1 and w2 be bounded continuous functions inRX satisfying w1 6 w2,
• V be all Borel measurable functions v inRX satisfying w1 6 v 6 w2, and
• C be the continuous functions in V .
Both V and C are understood as classes of candidate value functions. The functions w1
and w2 serve as lower and upper bounds for lifetime value respectively. Their role will
be clarified below.
Current and future payoffs are subsumed into a state-action aggregator Q, which maps a
feasible state-action pair (x, a) and function v in V into a real value Q(x, a, v). The inter-
pretation of Q(x, a, v) is total lifetime rewards, contingent on current action a, current
state x and the use of v to evaluate future states. In other words, Q(x, a, v) corresponds
to the right hand side of the Bellman equation when v represents the value function.
The central role of convexity and concavity was discussed in the introduction. To im-
plement the corresponding restrictions, we call Q value-convex if
Q(x, a,λv + (1− λ)w) 6 λQ(x, a, v) + (1− λ)Q(x, a, w)
for each (x, a) ∈ G, λ ∈ [0, 1] and v, w in V . Similarly, Q will be called value-concave
when the reverse inequality holds (i.e., when−Q is value-convex). One of these restric-
tions will be imposed on each problem we consider.
We also impose some basic properties that will be assumed in every case:
7Assumption 2.1. The following conditions hold:
(a) The feasible correspondence Γ is compact valued and continuous.
(b) The map (x, a) 7→ Q(x, a, v) is Borel measurable on G whenever v ∈ V and
continuous onGwhenever v ∈ C .
(c) The state-action aggregator satisfies
v 6 v′ =⇒ Q(x, a, v) 6 Q(x, a, v′) for all (x, a) ∈ G. (1)
(d) The functions w1 and w2 satisfy
w1(x) 6 Q(x, a, w1) and Q(x, a, w2) 6 w2(x) (2)
for all (x, a) inG.
The primary role of conditions (a) and (b) is to obtain existence of solutions. If the state
and action space are discrete (finite or countably infinite) then we adopt the discrete
topology, in which case the continuity requirements in (a) and (b) are satisfied auto-
matically, while the compactness requirement on Γ is satisfied if Γ(x) is finite for each
x.
Condition (c) imposes the natural requirement that higher continuation values increase
lifetime values, while condition (d) is a consistency requirement that allows w1 and w2
to act as lower and upper bounds for lifetime value. The conditions in assumption 2.1
are held to be true throughout the remainder of the paper.
Let Σ be a family of maps from X to A, referred to below as the set of all feasible policies,
such that each σ ∈ Σ is Borel measurable and satisfies σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) for all x ∈ X.
Lemma 2.1. The map w(x) := Q(x, σ(x), v) is an element of V for all v ∈ V .
Proof. Borel measurability of (x, a) 7→ Q(x, a, v) and σ imply that w is Borel measur-
able on X. Moreover, since w1 6 v, the inequalities in (1) and (2) imply w1(x) 6
Q(x, σ(x), w1) 6 Q(x, σ(x), v) for all x. In particular, w1 6 w. A similar argument
gives w 6 w2, so w ∈ V . 
Given σ ∈ Σ, a function vσ ∈ V that satisfies
vσ(x) = Q(x, σ(x), vσ) for all x ∈ X (3)
is called a σ-value function. The value vσ(x) can be interpreted as the lifetime value of
following policy σ. Its existence and uniqueness are discussed below.
82.1. Maximization. We begin by studying maximization of value. Our key assumption
is that the state-action aggregator satisfies value-convexity and possesses a strict upper
solution:
Assumption 2.2 (Convex Program). The following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Q is value-convex.
(b) There exists an ε > 0 such that Q(x, a, w2) 6 w2(x)− ε for all (x, a) ∈ G.
Note that part (b) is a strengthening of one of the conditions in (2).
Proposition 2.2. If assumption 2.2 holds, then, for each σ in Σ, the set V contains exactly one
σ-value function vσ.
Proposition 2.2 assures us that the value vσ of a given policy σ is well defined. From this
foundation we can introduce optimality concerning a maximization decision problem.
In particular, in the present setting, a policy σ∗ ∈ Σ is called optimal if
vσ∗(x) > vσ(x) for all σ ∈ Σ and all x ∈ X.
The maximum value function associated with this planning problem is the map v∗ defined
at x ∈ X by
v∗(x) = sup
σ∈Σ
vσ(x). (4)
One can show from conditions (c) and (d) of assumption 2.1 that v∗ is well defined as a
real valued function on X and satisfies w1 6 v∗ 6 w2.
A function v ∈ V is said to satisfy the Bellman equation if
v(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X. (5)
The Bellman operator T associated with our abstract dynamic program is a map sending
v in C into
Tv(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v). (6)
Since v is in C , existence of the maximum is guaranteed by assumption 2.1. It follows
from Berge’s theorem of the maximum that Tv is an element of C . Evidently solutions
to the Bellman equation in C exactly coincide with fixed points of T.
The convex program conditions lead to the following central result:
Theorem 2.3. If assumption 2.2 holds, then
9(a) The Bellman equation has exactly one solution in C and that solution is v∗.
(b) If v is in C , then Tnv→ v∗ uniformly on X as n→ ∞.
(c) A policy σ in Σ is optimal if and only if
σ(x) ∈ argmax
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗) for all x ∈ X.
(d) At least one optimal policy exists.
The fixed point and convergence results for T in theorem 2.3 rely on a fixed point the-
orem for isotone convex operators due to Du (1989), reprinted in section 2.1 of Zhang
(2012). In those references, convergence is shown to be uniformly geometric, in the
sense that there exist constants λ ∈ (0, 1) and K ∈ R such that
‖Tnv− v∗‖ 6 λnK for all n ∈ N and v ∈ C .
2.2. Minimization. Next we treat minimization. In this setting, the convexity and strict
upper solution in assumption 2.2 are replaced by concavity and a strict lower solution.
In order to maintain consistency with other sources, we admit some overloading of
terminology relative to section 2.1 on maximization. For example, the optimal policy
will now reference a minimizing policy rather than a maximizing one, and the Bellman
equation will shift from maximization to minimization. The relevant definition will be
clear from context.
The next assumption is analogous to assumption 2.2, which was used for maximization.
Assumption 2.3 (Concave Program). The following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Q is value-concave.
(b) There exists an ε > 0 such that Q(x, a, w1) > w1(x) + ε for all (x, a) ∈ G.
Note that part (b) is a strengthening of one of the conditions in (2).
Proposition 2.4. If assumption 2.3 holds, then, for each σ in Σ, the set V contains exactly one
σ-value function vσ.
Proposition 2.4 mimics proposition 2.2, assuring us that, in the present context, the cost
vσ of a given policy σ is well defined. A policy σ∗ ∈ Σ is then called optimal if
vσ∗(x) 6 vσ(x) for all σ ∈ Σ and all x ∈ X.
10
The minimum cost function associated with this planning problem is the function v∗ de-
fined at x ∈ X by
v∗(x) = inf
σ∈Σ
vσ(x). (7)
A function v ∈ V is said to satisfy the Bellman equation if
v(x) = min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X. (8)
The Bellman operator S associated with our abstract dynamic program is a map sending
v in C into
Sv(x) = min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v). (9)
Analogous to theorem 2.3, we have
Theorem 2.5. If assumption 2.3 holds, then
(a) The Bellman equation (8) has exactly one solution in C and that solution is the mini-
mum cost function v∗.
(b) If v is in C , then Snv→ v∗ uniformly on X as n→ ∞.
(c) A policy σ in Σ is optimal if and only if
σ(x) ∈ argmin
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗) for all x ∈ X.
(d) At least one optimal policy exists.
3. APPLICATIONS
In this section we study a collection of applications, showing how the general results
in section 2 can be used to solve the dynamic programming problems discussed in the
introduction.
3.1. An Additively Separable Decision Process. Before treating more sophisticated
preference specifications, it is worth noting that the results stated above can be ap-
plied in the standard additive separable case, alongside the more traditional Bellman–
Blackwell contraction mapping approach to dynamic programming. To see this, con-
sider the generic additively separable dynamic programming model of Stokey et al.
(1989) with Bellman equation
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
F(s, y, z) + β
∫
v(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
}
(10)
11
over (s, z) ∈ S× Z. Here S and Z are compact metric spaces containing possible values
for the endogenous and exogenous state variables, respectively. Let the transition func-
tion P on Z have the Feller property, let the feasible correspondence Γ : S× Z → S be
compact valued and continuous, let F : G→ R be continuous, and let β lie in (0, 1).
We translate this model to our environment by taking x := (s, z) to be the state, X :=
S× Z to be the state space, a = y ∈ S to be the action, and setting
Q((s, z), y, v) = F(s, y, z) + β
∫
v(y, z′)P(z, dz′).
Since F is continuous on a compact set, there exists a finite constant M with |F| 6 M.8
For the bracketing functions w1 and w2 we fix ε > 0 and adopt the constant functions
w1 ≡ − M1− β and w2 ≡
M + ε
1− β .
The conditions of assumption 2.1 are all satisfied. Conditions (a) and (b) are true by as-
sumption and condition (c) is trivial to verify. To see that condition (d) of assumption 2.1
holds, we note that w1 and w2 lie in bcX. In addition, for any given ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we
have
Q((s, z), y, w1) = F(s, y, z)− β M1− β > −M− β
M
1− β = w1(s, z).
Similarly,
Q((s, z), y, w2) = F(s, y, z) + β
M + ε
1− β 6 M + β
M + ε
1− β = w2(s, z)− ε.
The last inequality gives not only Q((s, z), y, w2) 6 w2(s, z), as required for part (d)
of assumption, but also the stronger condition in part (b) of assumption 2.2. Thus, to
verify the requirements of theorem 2.3, we need only check the convexity condition
in part (a) of assumption 2.2. But this is immediate from the linearity of expectations.
Hence theorem 2.3 applies.
3.2. Epstein-Zin Preferences. Epstein and Zin (1989) propose a specification of life-
time value that separates and independently parameterizes intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and risk aversion. Value is defined recursively by the CES aggregator
Ut =
[
(1− β)C1−ρt + β {Rt(Ut+1)}1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
(0 < ρ 6= 1),
where {Ct} is a consumption path, Ut is the utility value of the path onward from time
t, andRt is the Kreps-Porteus certainty equivalent operator
Rt(Ut+1) =
(
E tU
1−γ
t+1
) 1
1−γ
(0 < γ 6= 1).
8The domainG of F is compact in the product topology by Tychonoff’s theorem.
12
Here, E t stands for the conditional expectation with respect to the period t informa-
tion. The value 1/ρ represents elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) between the
composite good and the certainty equivalent, while γ governs the level of relative risk
aversion (RRA) with respect to atemporal gambles. The most empirically relevant case
is ρ < γ, implying that the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty. We focus on
this case in what follows.
Under Epstein–Zin preferences, the generic additively separable Bellman equation in
(10) becomes
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
v(y, z′)1−γP(z, dz′)
] 1−ρ
1−γ

1
1−ρ
(11)
for each (s, z) ∈ S× Z, where, here and below,
r(s, y, z) := (1− β)F(s, y, z)1−ρ.
We impose the same conditions on the primitives discussed in section 3.1. In particular,
F is continuous, P is Feller, Γ is continuous and compact valued and both S and Z
are compact. To ensure F(s, y, z)1−ρ is always well defined, we also assume that F is
everywhere positive.
3.2.1. The Case ρ < γ < 1. As in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012), we begin with the
continuous strictly increasing transformation vˆ = v1−γ, which allows us to rewrite (11)
as
vˆ(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
(12)
where
θ :=
1− γ
1− ρ .
Since this transformation is bijective, there is a one-to-one correspondence between v
and vˆ, in the sense that v solves (11) if and only if vˆ solves (12). Note that in the current
setting we have θ ∈ (0, 1).
The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (12) is
Q((s, z), y, v) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
v(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
. (13)
For the bracketing functions w1 and w2, we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions
w1 :=
(
m
1− β
)θ
and w2 :=
(
M + δ
1− β
)θ
,
13
where
m := min
((s,z),y)∈G
r(s, y, z) and M := max
((s,z),y)∈G
r(s, y, z). (14)
These values are finite and positive, since F is continuous and positive on a compact
domain.9 Being constant, w1 and w2 are continuous.
We now show that the conditions of assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are all satisfied. Regarding
assumption 2.1, condition (a) is true by assumption, while condition (b) follows imme-
diately from the continuity imposed on F and the Feller property of P. Condition (c) is
easy to verify, since, for any b > 0, the scalar map
ψ(t) := (b + βt1/θ)θ (t > 0) (15)
is monotone increasing. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G,
we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
m
1− β
}θ
>
{
m + β
m
1− β
}θ
= w1(s, z).
Similarly,
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
M + δ
1− β
}θ
6
{
M + β
M + δ
1− β
}θ
,
or, with some rearranging,
Q((s, z), y, w2) 6
{
M + δ
1− β − δ
}θ
< w2(s, z). (16)
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In fact, (16) implies that our choice of w2
also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.2.10
It only remains to check value-convexity of Q. But this is implied by the convexity of ψ
defined in (15), which holds whenever 0 < θ 6 1, along with linearity of the integral.
The conclusions of theorem 2.3 now follow.
3.2.2. The Case ρ < 1 < γ. To treat this case we again apply the continuous transforma-
tion vˆ ≡ v1−γ to the Bellman equation (11). But now 1− γ is negative, leading to the
minimization problem
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
(17)
9 In this case, positivity of F can be weakened to nonnegativity.
10To be precise, condition (b) holds when ε := [(M + δ)/(1− β)]θ − [(M + δ)/(1− β)− δ]θ .
14
for each (s, z) ∈ X. The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (17) is still as defined
in (13). Note that in the current setting we have θ < 0.
As (17) is a minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. For the bracketing
functions w1 and w2, we take the constant functions
w1 :=
(
M + δ
1− β
)θ
and w2 :=
(
m
1− β
)θ
,
where δ is a positive constant and m and M are as defined in (14).
The conditions of assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1,
the arguments verifying conditions (a) to (c) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. To
check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
M + δ
1− β
}θ
>
{
M + β
M + δ
1− β
}θ
,
or, with some rearranging,
Q((s, z), y, w1) >
{
M + δ
1− β − δ
}θ
> w1(s, z). (18)
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
m
1− β
}θ
6
{
m + β
m
1− β
}θ
,
and the last term is equal to w2(s, z). Hence, condition (d) of assumption 2.1 is verified.
Furthermore, it is immediate from (18) that our choice of w1 also satisfies the uniformly
strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.3.
It only remains to check the value-concavity of Q. But this follows directly from the
concavity of the function ψ defined in (15), as implied by θ < 0, along with linearity of
the integral. We have now checked all conditions of theorem 2.5.
3.2.3. The Case 1 < ρ < γ. We now turn to the model in the case where the coefficient
of relative risk aversion is still strictly great than 1 but intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution is less than 1, as is commonly found in the literature.11 As before, we apply the
continuous transformation vˆ ≡ v1−γ to the Bellman equation (11) and, since 1− γ < 0,
the transformed counterpart leads us to the minimization problem as defined in (17).
Note that θ > 1 in the current setting.
11See, for example, Hall (1988), Farhi and Werning (2008) and Basu and Bundick (2017).
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As (17) is a minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. For the bracketing
functions w1 and w2, we take the constant functions
w1 :=
(
m− δ
1− β
)θ
and w2 :=
(
M
1− β
)θ
,
for some positive δ < m, where m and M are as defined in (14).
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are again satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, the arguments
of verifying conditions (a) to (c) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. To check condition
(d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
m− δ
1− β
}θ
>
{
m + β
m− δ
1− β
}θ
,
or, with some rearranging
Q((s, z), y, w1) >
{
m− δ
1− β + δ
}θ
> w1(s, z). (19)
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
M
1− β
}θ
6
{
M + β
M
1− β
}θ
= w2(s, z).
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In fact (19) implies that our choice of w1
also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.3.
Value-concavity of Q is a direct consequence of the concavity of ψ, which holds again
when θ > 1, along with linearity of the integral. The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now
follow.
3.3. Risk Sensitive Preferences. In this section, we consider an economy with a rep-
resentative agent having the risk sensitive preferences, as in, say, Hansen and Sargent
(2008), Gottardi et al. (2015), or Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018). The generic Bellman
equation associated with risk sensitive preferences is
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z)− β
θ
ln
[∫
exp
(−θ v(y, z′)) P(z, dz′)]} (20)
for each (s, z) ∈ S×Z. Here, r : G→ R is a continuous one-period reward function. The
parameter θ > 0 captures the risk sensitivity, while other primitives are as discussed in
section 3.1. In particular, P is Feller, Γ is continuous and compact valued and both S
and Z are compact.
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Applying the continuous bijective transformation vˆ ≡ exp(−θv) to v in the Bellman
equation (20) leads to the minimization problem
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
exp
{
−θ
{
r(s, y, z)− β
θ
ln
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]}}
. (21)
We translate (21) to our environment by taking X := S× Z to be the state space, a = y ∈
S to be the action, and setting
Q((s, z), y, v) = exp
{
−θ
{
r(s, y, z)− β
θ
ln
[∫
v(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]}}
. (22)
Since r is continuous, there exists a finite constant M with |r| 6 M. For the bracketing
functions, we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions
w1 := exp
[
−θ
(
M
1− β + δ
)]
and w2 := exp
[
−θ
( −M
1− β
)]
.
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, the steps verifying
conditions (a) and (b) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. Condition (c) clearly holds,
since, for any b ∈ R, the scalar map
φ(t) := exp
[
−θ
(
b− β
θ
ln t
)]
(t > 0) (23)
is monotone increasing. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G,
we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) = exp
(
−θ
{
r(s, y, z) + β
(
M
1− β + δ
)})
> exp
(
−θ
{
M + β
(
M
1− β + δ
)})
or, with some rearranging,
Q((s, z), y, w1) > exp
(
−θ
{
M
1− β + βδ
})
> w1(s, z). (24)
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) = exp
(
−θ
{
r(s, y, z) + β
( −M
1− β
)})
6 exp
(
−θ
{
−M− β M
1− β
})
,
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and the last term is equal to w2(s, z). Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In
addition, it is obvious from (24) that our choice of w1 also satisfies the uniformly strict
inequality in part (b) of assumption 2.3.12
Finally, condition (a) of assumption 2.3, which is value-concavity of Q, follows from di-
rectly the concavity of the function φ defined in (23), along with linearity of the integral.
The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now follow.
3.4. Ambiguity. Extending earlier work by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Klibanoff et al.
(2009), Ju and Miao (2012) propose and study a recursive smooth ambiguity model
where lifetime value satisfies
Vt(C) =
[
(1− β)C1−ρ + β{Rt(Vt+1(C))}1−ρ
]1/(1−ρ)
(25)
with
Rt(Vt+1(C)) =
{
E µt
(
E piθ,t
[
V1−γt+1 (C)
])(1−η)/(1−γ)}1/(1−η)
. (26)
As before, ρ is the reciprocal of the EIS and γ governs risk aversion, while η satisfies
0 < η 6= 1 and captures ambiguity aversion. If η = γ, the decision maker is ambiguity
neutral and (25)–(26) reduces to the classical recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin
(1989). The decision maker displays ambiguity aversion if and only if γ < η. We focus
primarily on the case 0 < ρ 6 1 < γ < η, which is the most empirically relevant.13
As a generic formulation of the preferences of Ju and Miao (2012), we consider the
Bellman equation
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β

∫ [∫
v(y, z′)1−γpiθ(z, dz′)
] 1−η
1−γ
µ(z, dθ)

1−ρ
1−η

1
1−ρ
(27)
where (s, z) ∈ S× Z. We assume both S and Z to be compact, Γ to be continuous and
compact valued, F to be continuous and everywhere positive. The set Θ is a finite
parameter space, each element of which is a vector of parameters in the specification
of the exogenous state process. Given any θ ∈ Θ, the transition function piθ on Z is
assumed to have the Feller property. Given any z ∈ Z, the distribution µ(z, ·) maps
subsets of Θ to [0, 1] and evolves as a function of the exogenous state process. We
suppose that µ is continuous in z for each θ ∈ Θ.
12 To be precise, condition (b) of assumption 2.3 holds when we set ε := exp{−θ[M/(1− β) + βδ]} −
exp{−θ[M/(1− β) + δ]}.
13The calibration used in Ju and Miao (2012) is (ρ,γ, η) = (0.66, 2.0, 8.86). See p. 574.
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3.4.1. The Case ρ 6= 1. Applying the continuous bijective transformation vˆ ≡ v1−η to v
in the Bellman equation (27) leads to the minimization problem
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β
{∫ [∫
vˆ(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)
] 1
ξ1
µ(z, dθ)
} 1
ξ2

ξ2
(28)
for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, where, here and below,
ξ1 :=
1− γ
1− η and ξ2 :=
1− η
1− ρ .
Since this transformation is bijective, there is a one-to-one correspondence between v
and vˆ, in the sense that v solves (27) if and only if vˆ solves (28). Note that in the current
setting we have ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ2 < 0.
We translate this model to our environment by taking X := S× Z to be the state space,
a = y to be the action taking values in S, and setting the state-action aggregator Q to
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) =
r(s, y, z) + β
{∫ [∫
vˆ(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)
] 1
ξ1
µ(z, dθ)
} 1
ξ2

ξ2
. (29)
As (28) is a minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. For the bracketing
functions w1 and w2, we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions
w1 :=
(
M + δ
1− β
)ξ2
and w2 :=
(
m
1− β
)ξ2
,
where the real numbers m and M are as defined in section 3.2.1.
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, condition (a) is true
by assumption. Conditions (b) and (c) are proved in lemma 5.12 in the appendix. To
verify condition (d), for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
r(s, y, z) + β
{∫ (M + δ
1− β
)ξ2
µ(z, dθ)
}1/ξ2
ξ2
=
{
r(s, y, z) + β
M + δ
1− β
}ξ2
>
{
M + β
M + δ
1− β
}ξ2
,
where the first equality follows from directly the definition of Q and the fact that for any
non-negative constant function d, we have [
∫
d(z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)]1/ξ1 = d. Furthermore,
with some rearranging, we obtain
Q((s, z), y, w1) >
{
M + δ
1− β − δ
}ξ2
> w1(s, z). (30)
19
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
r(s, y, z) + β
{∫ ( m
1− β
)ξ2
µ(z, dθ)
}1/ξ2
ξ2
=
{
r(s, y, z) + β
m
1− β
}ξ2
6
{
m + β
m
1− β
}ξ2
= w2(s, z).
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 indeed holds true. Moreover, it is clear from (30)
that our choice of w1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in part (b) of assump-
tion 2.3.
Condition (a) of assumption 2.3 (i.e., value-concavity of Q) is also satisfied, as shown in
lemma 5.12 of the appendix. The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now follow.
3.4.2. The Case ρ = 1. In the limiting case with ρ = 1, the generic ambiguity recursion
(26) becomes
Ut(C) =(1− β) ln Ct
+
β
1− η ln
{
E µt exp
(
1− η
1− γ ln
(
E piθ,t exp ((1− γ)Ut+1)
))}
,
(31)
where Ut = ln Vt.14 The generic Bellman equation in (27) becomes
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) +
β
1− η×
× ln
[∫
exp
(
1
ξ1
ln
(∫
exp
(
(1− γ)v(y, z′))piθ(z, dz′))) µ(z, dθ)]}, (32)
for each (s, z) ∈ S× Z. The one-period return function r is still assumed to be contin-
uous but no longer restricted to be positive, while other primitives are as discussed in
section 3.4.1.
Applying the transformation vˆ ≡ exp[(1− η)v] to v in the Bellman equation (32) leads
us to the minimization problem
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) +
β
1− η×
× ln
[∫
exp
(
1
ξ1
ln
(∫
exp
(
ξ1 ln vˆ(y, z′)
)
piθ(z, dz′)
))
µ(z, dθ)
]})
.
(33)
14This specification connects with risk-sensitive control and robustness, as studied by Hansen and Sar-
gent (2008). In particular, there are two risk-sensitivity adjustments in (31).
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With some rearranging, (33) can be written as
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) +
β
1− η×
× ln
[∫ (∫
vˆ(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)
)1/ξ1
µ(z, dθ)
]})
.
(34)
Note that we still have ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) and η > 1 in the current setting with ambiguity
aversion. The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (34) is
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) = exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) +
β
1− η×
× ln
[∫ (∫
vˆ(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)
)1/ξ1
µ(z, dθ)
]})
.
(35)
Since the return function r is continuous on a compact set, there exists a finite constant
M such that |r| 6 M. Hence for the bracketing function w1 and w2, we fix δ > 0 and
take the constant functions
w1 := exp
(
(1− η)
(
M
1− β + δ
))
and w2 := exp
(
(1− η)
( −M
1− β
))
.
As (34) is the minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. Again, assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied.
Regarding assumption 2.1, condition (a) is trivial. Conditions (b) and (c) follow from
lemma 5.14 in the appendix. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈
G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) = exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
(
M
1− β + δ
)})
> exp
(
(1− η)
{
M + β
(
M
1− β + δ
)})
,
or, with some rearranging,
Q((s, z), y, w1) > exp
(
(1− η)
{
M
1− β + βδ
})
> w1(s, z). (36)
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) = exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
( −M
1− β
)})
6 exp
(
(1− η)
{
−M− β M
1− β
})
= w2(s, z).
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Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds.
In fact, it is immediate from (36) that our choice of w1 also satisfies the uniformly strict
inequality in part (b) of assumption 2.3. Regarding part (a) of assumption 2.3, value-
concavity of Q is immediate from lemma 5.14. We have now checked all conditions of
theorem 2.5, and hence the conclusions of that theorem now follow.
3.5. Narrow framing. In this section we study the recursive preferences that incorpo-
rate both first-order risk aversion and narrow framing, as in, say, Barberis et al. (2006)
or Barberis and Huang (2009), which can be expressed as
Ut =
(1− β)C1−ρt + β
{(
E t U
1−γ
t+1
) 1
1−γ
+ b0E t
(
∑
i=1
u¯(G˜i,t+1)
)}1−ρ 11−ρ ,
where b0 > 0 is a parameter controlling the degree of narrow framing, while G˜i,t+1 rep-
resents the specific gamble the agent is taking by investing in asset i whose uncertainty
will be resolved between period t and t + 1.15 First-order risk aversion is introduced
through the piecewise linearity of u¯(·).16 Relative to the recursive specification in sec-
tion 3.2, the new term prefixed by b0 shows that the agent obtains utility directly from
the outcomes of gambles {G˜i,t+1}i over and above what those outcomes mean for to-
tal wealth risk, rather than just indirectly via its contribution to next period’s wealth.
Other primitives are as discussed in section 3.2. For the parameters ρ and γ, we assume
that either 1 < ρ < γ or ρ < 1 < γ.
Under the preceding preference specification, the generic Bellman equation becomes
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β
[(∫
v(y, z′)1−γP(z, dz′)
) 1
1−γ
+ B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ
1
1−ρ
.
(37)
As before, we suppose that the one-period return function r(s, y, z) is positive and con-
tinuous on G, while the aggregate gambling utility function B(s, y, z) is assumed to be
nonnegative and continuous onG.
15 A zero value of the parameter b0 means no narrow framing at all, while a large value of b0 indicates
that Gi,t+1 is evaluated almost completely in isolation from other risks.
16 The piecewise-linear specification of u¯(·) in Barberis et al. (2006) is defined by u¯(x) = x1{x >
0}+ λx1{x < 0} with λ > 1.
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We again apply the continuous transformation vˆ ≡ v1−γ to the Bellman equation (37).
As 1− γ is negative, the transformed counterpart leads us to the minimization problem
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β
[(∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
) 1
1−γ
+ B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ
θ
, (38)
where θ := (1− γ)/(1− ρ). The state-action aggregator is
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) =
r(s, y, z) + β
[(∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
) 1
1−γ
+ B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ
θ
. (39)
Lemma 3.1. Let Q be as defined in (39). If either ρ < 1 < γ or 1 < ρ < γ, then there exist
continuous strictly positive functions w1, w2 on S× Z, w1 < w2, such that
(SL) there exists an ε > 0 such that Q((s, z), y, w1) > w1(s, z) + ε for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G;
and
(U) Q((s, z), y, w2) 6 w2(s, z) for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G.
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
The conditions of assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1,
condition (a) is true by assumption, while condition (b) follows immediately from the
continuity imposed on r and B and the Feller property of P. Condition (c) is easy to
verify, since, for any fixed constants c > 0 and b > 0, the scalar map
ψ(t) :=
{
c + β
[
t
1
1−γ + b
]1−ρ}θ
(t > 0) (40)
is monotone increasing. Condition (d) and part (b) of assumption 2.3 have been verified
by lemma 3.1.
It only remains to check value-concavity of Q. But this follows directly from the concav-
ity of ψ defined in (40), as implied by either ρ < 1 < γ or 1 < ρ < γ, along with linearity
of the integral. Hence all conditions of theorem 2.5 are verified and the conclusions of
that theorem follow.
4. UNBOUNDED REWARDS
This section gives an example of how the methodology proposed above can be extended
to the setting of unbounded rewards. The application we consider is the Epstein-Zin
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problem of section 3.2.3, where 1 < ρ < γ, with Bellman equation
v(s, z) = max
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
v(y, z′)1−γP(z, dz′)
] 1−ρ
1−γ

1
1−ρ
for each (s, z) ∈ S× Z. Dropping the compactness assumption, we allow S and Z to
be arbitrary separable metric spaces containing possible values for the endogenous and
exogenous state variables respectively. As before, P is Feller, Γ is compact valued and
continuous, while r : G → R is continuous and β lies in (0, 1). Let θ be defined by
θ = (1− γ)/(1− ρ), so that θ > 1 in the current setting.
In addition, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.1. There exist a continuous function κ : S × Z → [1,∞), positive con-
stants M, L with L 6 M, and c ∈ (0, 1/βθ) and d ∈ [0, 1/βθ) satisfying the conditions
sup
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) 6 Mκ(s, z) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, (41)
inf
y∈Γ(s,z)
r(s, y, z) > Lκ(s, z) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, (42)
sup
y∈Γ(s,z)
∫
κ(y, z′)θP(z, dz′) 6 cκ(s, z)θ for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, (43)
inf
y∈Γ(s,z)
∫
κ(y, z′)P(z, dz′) > dκ(s, z) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z. (44)
Moreover, the map (y, z) 7→ ∫ κ(y, z′)θP(z, dz′) is continuous on S× Z.
In what follows, given a real-valued continuous function ` defined on S×Zwith `(s, z) >
0 for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, a function f : S× Z → R is called `-bounded if f (s, z)/`(s, z) is
bounded as (s, z) ranges over S× Z.
As in section 3.2.3, we apply the continuous transformation vˆ ≡ v1−γ to the Bellman
equation. Since 1 − γ < 0, the transformed counterpart leads us to a minimization
problem with state-action aggregator
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
.
For the bracketing functions w1 and w2, we fix δ such that 0 < δ < L, and then adopt
the functions
w1 := (L− δ)θ · κ and w2 :=
(
M
1− βc1/θ
)θ
· κθ .
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Note that κ 6 κθ , since θ > 1 and κ > 1. Hence w1 and w2 are both κθ-bounded. In ad-
dition, the positivity and the continuity of κ directly imply the positivity and continuity
of w1 and w2. Hence, such w1 and w2 are positive κθ-bounded continuous functions in
R
X with w1 6 w2.
Let V and C be all Borel measurable functions v in RX satisfying w1 6 v 6 w2, and be
the continuous functions in V respectively. For fixed σ ∈ Σ, a function vˆσ ∈ V is called
σ-value function if
vˆσ(s, z) =
{
r(s, σ(s, z), z) + β
[∫
vˆσ(σ(s, z), z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
for all (s, z) ∈ S × Z. The following proposition states a result for its existence and
uniqueness.
Proposition 4.1. If assumption 4.1 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the set V contains exactly one
σ-value function vˆσ.
From this foundation, the minimum cost function vˆ∗ associated with this planning prob-
lem is defined at (s, z) ∈ S× Z by
vˆ∗(s, z) = inf
σ∈Σ
vˆσ(s, z).
A function vˆ ∈ V is said to satisfy the Bellman equation if
vˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
.
In this connection, the corresponding Bellman operator S on C is defined through
Svˆ(s, z) = inf
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
.
Analogous to the result in bounded case (see, e.g., section 3.2.3), we have
Theorem 4.2. If assumptions 4.1 holds, then
(a) The minimum cost function vˆ∗ lies in C and is the unique solution of the Bellman
equation (17) in that set.
(b) If vˆ is in C , then Snvˆ→ vˆ∗ as n→ ∞.
(c) A policy σ in Σ is optimal if and only if
σ(s, z) ∈ argmin
y∈Γ(s,z)
Q((s, z), y, vˆ∗) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z.
(d) At least one optimal policy exists.
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5. APPENDIX
Let mX represent all Borel measurable functions inRX and let cX denote all continuous
functions in mX. Let bmX be the bounded functions in mX and let bcX be the continuous
functions in bmX. Let mX+ and mX++ be the non-negative and positive functions in mX,
respectively. Recall that a self map A on a convex subset M of bmX is called
• asymptotically stable on M if A has a unique fixed point v∗ in M and Anv→ v∗ as
n→ ∞ whenever v ∈ M,
• isotone if Av 6 Av′ whenever v, v′ ∈ M with v 6 v′,
• convex if A(λv + (1− λ)v′) 6 λAv + (1− λ)Av′ whenever v, v′ ∈ M and 0 6
λ 6 1, and
• concave if A(λv + (1− λ)v′) > λAv + (1− λ)Av′ whenever v, v′ ∈ M and 0 6
λ 6 1.
For f , g ∈ bmX, the statement f  g means that there exists an ε > 0 such that f (x) 6
g(x)− ε for all x ∈ X.
For each σ ∈ Σ, we define the σ-value operator Tσ on V by
Tσv(x) := Q(x, σ(x), v) for all x ∈ X, v ∈ V . (45)
Stating that vσ ∈ V solves (3) is equivalent to stating that vσ is a fixed point of Tσ. By
lemma 2.1, the operator Tσ is a well defined self-map on V .
5.1. Proofs for the Convex Case.
Lemma 5.1. If assumption 2.2 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator Tσ is asymptotically
stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.1. Fix σ ∈ Σ. We aim to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990). To this end, it
is sufficient to show that
(i) Tσ is isotone and convex on V .
(ii) Tσw1 > w1 and Tσw2  w2.
Regarding condition (i), pick any v, v′ ∈ V with v 6 v′. For fixed x ∈ X, we have
Tσv(x) = Q(x, σ(x), v) 6 Q(x, σ(x), v′) = Tσv′(x),
by (1). Hence, isotonicity of Tσ holds.
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To see that Tσ is convex, fix v, v′ ∈ V and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given x ∈ X, we have
Tσ(λv + (1− λ)v′)(x) = Q(x, σ(x),λv + (1− λ)v′)
6 λQ(x, σ(x), v) + (1− λ)Q(x, σ(x), v′)
= λTσv(x) + (1− λ)Tσv′(x),
where the inequality directly follows from part (a) of assumption 2.2. Since x ∈ X was
arbitrary, the convexity of Tσ follows.
The first part of condition (ii) follows directly from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
Tσw1(x) = Q(x, σ(x), w1) > w1(x).
To see that the second part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of as-
sumption 2.2 that
Tσw2(x) = Q(x, σ(x), w2) 6 w2(x)− ε
for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence w2  Tσw2, as was to be shown. 
Proof of proposition 2.2. This follows directly from lemma 5.1. 
Given v ∈ V , a policy σ in Σ will be called v-maximal-greedy if
σ(x) ∈ argmax
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X. (46)
Lemma 5.2. If v ∈ C , then there exists at least one v-maximal-greedy policy.
Proof. Fixing v ∈ C and using the compactness and continuity conditions in assump-
tion 2.1, we can choose for each x ∈ X an action σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) such that (46) holds. The
map σ constructed in this manner can be chosen to be Borel measurable by theorem
18.19 of Aliprantis and Border (2006). 
Lemma 5.3. If assumption 2.2 holds, then T is asymptotically stable on C .
Proof of lemma 5.3. In order to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990), it suffices to show that
(i) T is isotone and convex on C .
(ii) Tw1 > w1 and Tw2  w2.
The isotonicity of T on C is obvious, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
v 6 v′ =⇒ max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) 6 max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X.
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In other words, by definition of T, v 6 v′ implies Tv 6 Tv′.
To show the convexity of T, fix v, v′ ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given (x, a) ∈ G, we
have, by part (a) of assumption 2.2,
Q(x, a,λv + (1− λ)v′) 6 λQ(x, a, v) + (1− λ)Q(x, a, v′)
6 λ max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) + (1− λ) max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v′)
= λTv(x) + (1− λ)Tv′(x).
Since (x, a) ∈ Gwas arbitrary, the above inequality implies
max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a,λv + (1− λ)v′) 6 λTv(x) + (1− λ)Tv′(x)
for each x ∈ X, which in turn means that T[λv + (1− λ)v′] 6 λTv + (1− λ)Tv′.
The first part of condition (ii) follows directly from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
Tw1(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, w1) > Q(x, a, w1) > w1(x).
To see that the second part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of as-
sumption 2.2 that
Tw2(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, w2) 6 w2(x)− ε
for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence, Tw2  w2, as was to be shown. 
Theorem 5.4. If Tσ is asymptotically stable on V for all σ ∈ Σ and T is asymptotically stable
on C , then the conclusions of theorem 2.3 hold.
Proof. Let v∗ be the maximum value function and let v¯ be the unique fixed point of T in
C . To see that v¯ = v∗, first observe that v¯ ∈ C and hence v¯ has at least one maximal-
greedy policy σ. For this policy we have, by definition, Tσv¯(x) = Tv¯(x) at each x, from
which it follows that v¯ = Tv¯ = Tσv¯. Since Tσ is asymptotically stable on V , we know
that its unique fixed point is vσ, so v¯ = vσ. But then v¯ 6 v∗, by the definition of v∗.
To see that the reverse inequality holds, pick any σ ∈ Σ. We have Tσv¯ 6 Tv¯ = v¯.
Iterating on this inequality and using the isotonicity of Tσ gives Tkσ v¯ 6 v¯ for all k. Taking
the limit with respect to k and using the asymptotic stability of Tσ then gives vσ 6 v¯.
Hence v∗ 6 v¯, and we can now conclude that v¯ = v∗.
Since v¯ ∈ C , we have v∗ ∈ C . It follows that v∗ is the unique solution to the Bellman
maximization equation in C , and that Tnv → v∗ whenever v ∈ C . Parts (a) and (b) of
theorem 2.3 are now established.
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Regarding part (c) and (d), by the definition of maximal-greedy policies, we know that
σ is v∗-maximal-greedy iff Q(x, σ(x), v∗) = maxa∈Γ(x) Q(x, a, v∗) for all x ∈ X. Since v∗
satisfies the Bellman maximization equation, we then have
σ is v∗-maximal-greedy ⇐⇒ Q(x, σ(x), v∗) = v∗(x), ∀ x ∈ X.
But, by proposition 2.2, the right hand side is equivalent to the statement that v∗ = vσ.
Hence, by this chain of logic and the definition of optimality,
σ is v∗-maximal-greedy ⇐⇒ v∗ = vσ ⇐⇒ σ is optimal (47)
Moreover, the fact that v∗ is in C combined with lemma 5.2 assures us that at least
one v∗-maximal-greedy policy exists. Each such policy is optimal, so the set of optimal
policies is nonempty. 
5.2. Proofs for the Concave Case.
Lemma 5.5. If assumption 2.3 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator Tσ is asymptotically
stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.5. Fix σ ∈ Σ. We aim to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990). To this end, it
is sufficient to show that
(i) Tσ is isotone and concave on V , and
(ii) Tσw1  w1 and Tσw2 6 w2.
Clearly, Tσ is isotone, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
v 6 v′ =⇒ Q(x, σ(x), v) 6 Q(x, σ(x), v′) for all x ∈ X.
In other words, v 6 v′ implies Tσv 6 Tσv′.
Regarding the concavity of Tσ, fix v, v′ ∈ V and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given x ∈ X, by
virtue of part (a) of assumption 2.3, we obtain
Tσ(λv + (1− λ)v′)(x) = Q(x, σ(x),λv + (1− λ)v′)
> λQ(x, σ(x), v) + (1− λ)Q(x, σ(x), v′)
= λTσv(x) + (1− λ)Tσv′(x).
Since x ∈ X was arbitrary, the concavity of Tσ follows.
To see that the first part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of assump-
tion 2.3 that
Tσw1(x) = Q(x, σ(x), w1) > w1(x) + ε
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for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence, Tσw1  w1, as was to be shown.
The second part of condition (ii) follows directly from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
Tσw2(x) = Q(x, σ(x), w2) 6 w2(x).
This completes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 2.4. This follows directly from lemma 5.5. 
Given v ∈ V , a policy σ in Σ will be called v-minimal-greedy if
σ(x) ∈ argmin
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X. (48)
Lemma 5.6. If v ∈ C , then there exists at least one v-minimal-greedy policy.
Proof. The proof of lemma 5.6 is essentially identical to that of lemma 5.2, and hence is
omitted here. 
Lemma 5.7. If assumption 2.3 holds, then S is asymptotically stable on C .
Proof of lemma 5.7. It follows from Berge’s theorem of the minimum that, when v is in
C , we have
Sv(x) = min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v)
and Sv is an element of C .
In order to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990), it suffices to show that
(i) S is isotone and concave on C , and
(ii) Sw1  w1 and Sw2 6 w2.
The isotonicity of S on C is obvious, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
v 6 v′ =⇒ min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) 6 min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X.
In other words, by definition of S, v 6 v′ implies Sv 6 Sv′.
To show the concavity of S, fix v, v′ ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given (x, a) ∈ G, by
part (a) of assumption 2.3, we have
Q(x, a,λv + (1− λ)v′) > λQ(x, a, v) + (1− λ)Q(x, a, v′)
> λ min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) + (1− λ) min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v′)
= λSv(x) + (1− λ)Sv′(x).
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Since (x, a) ∈ Gwas arbitrary, the above inequality implies
min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a,λv + (1− λ)v′) > λSv(x) + (1− λ)Sv′(x)
for each x ∈ X; namely, S[λv + (1− λ)v′] > λSv + (1− λ)Sv′, as desired.
To see that the first part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of assump-
tion 2.3 that
Sw1(x) = min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, w1) > w1(x) + ε
for each x ∈ X and some ε > 0. Hence, Sw1  w1.
The second part of condition (ii) directly follows from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
Sw2(x) = min
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, w2) 6 Q(x, a, w2) 6 w2(x).
This finishes the proof. 
Theorem 5.8. If Tσ is asymptotically stable on V for all σ ∈ Σ and S is asymptotically stable
on C , then the conclusions of theorem 2.5 hold.
Proof. Let v∗ be the minimum cost function and let v¯ be the unique fixed point of S in C .
To see that v¯ = v∗, first observe that v¯ ∈ C and hence v¯ has at least one minimal-greedy
policy σ. For this policy we have, by definition, Tσv¯(x) = Sv¯(x) at each x, from which
it follows that v¯ = Sv¯ = Tσv¯. Since Tσ is asymptotically stable on V , we know that its
unique fixed point is vσ, so v¯ = vσ. But then v¯ > v∗, by the definition of v∗ in (7).
To see that the reverse inequality holds, pick any σ ∈ Σ. We have Tσv¯ > Sv¯ = v¯.
Iterating on this inequality and using the isotonicity of Tσ gives Tkσ v¯ > v¯ for all k. Taking
the limit with respect to k and using the asymptotic stability of Tσ then gives vσ > v¯.
Hence v∗ > v¯, and we can now conclude that v¯ = v∗.
Since v¯ ∈ C , we have v∗ ∈ C . Moreover, for v in C we can replace the inf in the
definition of S with a min, and solutions to the Bellman equation in C exactly coincide
with fixed points of S in that set. It follows that v∗ is the unique solution to the Bellman
equation in C , and that Snv → v∗ whenever v ∈ C . Parts (a) and (b) of theorem 2.5 are
now established.
Regarding part (c) and (d), by the definition of minimal-greedy policies, we know that
σ is v∗-minimal-greedy iff Q(x, σ(x), v∗) = mina∈Γ(x) Q(x, a, v∗) for all x ∈ X. Since v∗
satisfies the Bellman equation, we then have
σ is v∗-minimal-greedy ⇐⇒ Q(x, σ(x), v∗) = v∗(x), ∀ x ∈ X.
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But, by proposition 2.4, the right hand side is equivalent to the statement that v∗ = vσ.
Hence, by this chain of logic and the definition of optimality,
σ is v∗-minimal-greedy ⇐⇒ v∗ = vσ ⇐⇒ σ is optimal (49)
Moreover, the fact that v∗ is in C combined with lemma 5.6 assures us that at least
one v∗-minimal-greedy policy exists. Each such policy is optimal, so the set of optimal
policies is nonempty. 
5.3. Proofs for Section 3.4. In this section, we prove some properties of the state-action
aggregator Q defined in section 3.4.
For the sake of exposition, fix θ ∈ Θ, we first define an operator Rθ on bm(S× Z)+ by
(Rθw)(y, z) :=
[∫
w(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)
]1/ξ1
for all (y, z) ∈ S× Z. (50)
From this foundation, we then define an operator R that is a map sending w in bm(S×
Z)+ into
Rw(y, z, θ) := (Rθw)(y, z) for all (y, z, θ) ∈ S× Z×Θ. (51)
The following lemma shows some useful properties of the operator Rθ .
Lemma 5.9. For fixed θ ∈ Θ, if ξ1 lies in (0, 1), then the operator Rθ defined in (50) is isotone
and concave on bm(S× Z)+.
Moreover, the function Rθw is nonnegative, bounded, and Borel measurable on S× Z whenever
w ∈ bm(S× Z)+ and continuous on S× Z whenever w ∈ bc(S× Z)+.
Proof of lemma 5.9. Fix θ ∈ Θ. The isotonicity of Rθ is obvious, since the scalar function
R+ 3 t 7→ tξ1 ∈ R+ and its inverse are both strictly increasing onR+.
Since ξ1 ∈ (0, 1), by Theorem 198 of Hardy et al. (1934), we know that Rθ is super-
additive in the sense that for any w, w′ ∈ m(S× Z)+, Rθ(w + w′) > Rθ(w) + Rθ(w′).17
As a result, the super-additivity and the positive homogeneity of Rθ together yield the
concavity of Rθ .18 Indeed, pick any λ ∈ [0, 1] and w, w′ ∈ m(S× Z)+, by the convexity
17 This result can also be reviewed as the reverse Minkowski inequality, see, for example, Proposition
3.2 in page 225 of DiBenedetto (2002).
18 An operator A defined on the positive cone bmX+ of bmX is called positively homogeneous (of the first
degree) if for any v in bmX+ and any real number t > 0, we have A(tv) = tAv.
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of m(S× Z)+, we have
Rθ [λw + (1− λ)w′] > Rθ(λw) + Rθ((1− λ)w′) (by super-additivity)
= λRθ(w) + (1− λ)Rθ(w′) (by positive homogeneity),
as was to be shown.
Regarding the second claim of lemma 5.9, non-negativity and boundedness of Rθw
is immediate and it is easy to see that Rθw is Borel measurable on S × Z whenever
w ∈ bm(S× Z)+. Now fix w ∈ bc(S× Z)+. We note that the function wξ1 also lies in
bc(S× Z)+. Then, by virtue of Feller property of piθ , the mapping S× Z 3 (y, z) 7→∫
w(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′) ∈ R+ is bounded and continuous on S× Z. Furthermore, it fol-
lows that the mapping S× Z 3 (y, z) 7→ [∫ w(y, z′)ξ1piθ(z, dz′)]1/ξ1 ∈ R+ is continuous
on S× Z, since the inverse of the map t 7→ tξ1 is also continuous on R+. Therefore, our
claim follows. 
As an application of lemma 5.9, we now present the next result.
Lemma 5.10. The operator R defined in (51) is a well-defined map from bm(S × Z)+ into
bm(S× Z×Θ)+.
Proof of lemma 5.10. Fix w in bm(S× Z)+. Since boundedness and non-negativity of the
function Rw are obvious, it remains to show that Rw is measurable on S× Z×Θ.
On one hand, for each θ ∈ Θ, it follows from lemma 5.9 that the function Rw(·, ·, θ) =
Rθw : S× Z → R+ is Borel measurable. On the other hand, for each (y, z) ∈ S× Z, the
function Rw(y, z, ·) : Θ → R+ is continuous, since Θ is a finite set (endowed with the
discrete topology).
In this connection, we conclude that the function Rw : S×Z×Θ→ R is a Carathe´odory
function, in the sense that
(1) for each θ ∈ Θ, the function Rw(·, ·, θ) : S× Z→ R is Borel measurable; and
(2) for each (y, z) ∈ S× Z, the function Rw(y, z, ·) : Θ→ R is continuous.
By lemma 4.51 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), it follows that the Carathe´odory function
Rw is jointly measurable on S× Z×Θ, as desired. 
In this connection, the state-action aggregator Q defined in (29) can be simply expressed
as a composition of two operators R and Q˜ as follows
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) := Q˜((s, z), y, Rvˆ), (52)
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with
Q˜((s, z), y, h) :=
{
r(s, y, z) + β
{∫
h(y, z, θ)µ(z, dθ)
}1/ξ2}ξ2
(53)
for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G and h ∈ bm(S× Z×Θ)++.
It is worth noting that the formula of Q˜ defined in (53) is almost identical to that of Q
defined in (13). Hence, recalling the results associated with Q in section 3.2.2, we have
Lemma 5.11. If ξ2 < 0, then Q˜ defined in (53) is isotone and concave in its third argument on
bm(S× Z×Θ)++.
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) 7→ Q˜((s, z), y, h) is Borel measurable on G whenever h ∈
bm(S× Z×Θ)++, and continuous on G whenever the map h(·, ·, θ) : S× Z → R++ is con-
tinuous, for each θ ∈ Θ.
Proof of lemma 5.11. Analogous to the proofs in section 3.2.2, for any fixed b > 0, we
consider the scalar map ψ(t) := (b + βt1/ξ2)ξ2 where t > 0. Since ξ2 < 0, it is clear that
the scalar function ψ is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave on R++ (cf.
section 3.2.2). The first part of claim is immediate from the monotonicity and concavity
of ψ, along with monotonicity and linearity of the integral.
For the remaining part, fix h in bm(S× Z× Θ)++. Borel measurability of ((s, z), y) 7→
Q˜((s, z), y, h) is obvious. Now fix a function h satisfying that the map h(·, ·, θ) : S× Z→
R++ is continuous, for every θ ∈ Θ. By virtue of the continuity imposed on the distribu-
tion µ(·, ·) and the finiteness of Θ, the map S× Z 3 (y, z) 7→ ∫ h(y, z, θ)µ(z, dθ) ∈ R++
is continuous on S× Z. It then follows from the continuity imposed on r and the conti-
nuity of ψ that ((s, z), y) 7→ Q˜((s, z), y, h) is continuous onG. 
Lemma 5.12. If ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ2 < 0, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (29) is
isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S× Z)++.
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) 7→ Q((s, z), y, v) is Borel measurable on G whenever v ∈
bm(S× Z)++ and continuous onG whenever v ∈ bc(S× Z)++.
Proof of lemma 5.12. Since the aggregator Q is a composition of Q˜ and R, by lemmas 5.9
to 5.11, the isotonicity, Borel measurability and continuity of Q immediately follow from
those of Q˜ and R.
It only remains to show the concavity of Q. To see this, fix ((s, z), y) ∈ G, λ ∈ [0, 1]
and w, w′ in bm(S× Z)++. For any given θ ∈ Θ, by concavity of Rθ and convexity of
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bm(S× Z)++, we have
Rθ [λw + (1− λ)w′](y, z) > λRθw(y, z) + (1− λ)Rθw′(y, z);
that is, for each (y, z, θ) ∈ S× Z×Θ,
R[λw + (1− λ)w′](y, z, θ) > λRw(y, z, θ) + (1− λ)Rw′(y, z, θ).
In operator notation, this translates to R[λw + (1− λ)w′] > λRw + (1− λ)Rw′.
Observe that due to isotonicity and concavity of Q˜, we now obtain
Q((s, z), y,λw + (1− λ)w′) = Q˜((s, z), y, R[λw + (1− λ)w′])
> Q˜((s, z), y,λRw + (1− λ)Rw′)
> λQ˜((s, z), y, Rw) + (1− λ)Q˜((s, z), y, Rw′)
= λQ((s, z), y, w) + (1− λ)Q((s, z), y, w′),
where the first and last equalities follow immediately from the definition of Q in (52),
while the first and second inequalities follow from isotonicity and concavity of Q˜, re-
spectively. This completes the proof. 
Analogously, the state-action aggregator Q defined in (35) can be expressed as
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) = Q˜((s, z), y, Rvˆ),
with the operator R defined as above, but
Q˜((s, z), y, h) := exp
(
(1− η)
{
r(s, y, z) +
β
1− η ln
[∫
h(y, z, θ)µ(z, dθ)
]})
(54)
for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G and h ∈ bm(S× Z×Θ)++.
Observe that the formula of Q˜ defined above is almost identical to that of Q defined
in (22). In this connection, recalling the results associated with Q in section 3.3, it is
easy to see that
Lemma 5.13. If η > 1, then Q˜ defined in (54) is isotone and concave in its third argument on
bm(S× Z×Θ)++.
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) 7→ Q˜((s, z), y, h) is Borel measurable on G whenever h ∈
bm(S× Z×Θ)++, and continuous on G whenever the map h(·, ·, θ) : S× Z → R++ is con-
tinuous, for each θ ∈ Θ.
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Proof of lemma 5.13. Analogous to the proof of lemma 5.11, for fixed b ∈ R, we consider
the scalar map
ψ(t) := exp
[
(1− η)
(
b +
β
1− η ln t
)]
(t > 0).
It is clear that this scalar function ψ is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave
on R++.19 As a consequence, the remaining proof of lemma 5.13 is identical to that of
lemma 5.11, and thus omitted here. 
Lemma 5.14. If ξ1 ∈ (0, 1) and η > 1, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (35) is
isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S× Z)++.
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) 7→ Q((s, z), y, v) is Borel measurable on G whenever v ∈
bm(S× Z)++ and continuous onG whenever v ∈ bc(S× Z)++.
Proof of lemma 5.14. Invoking lemmas 5.9, 5.10 and 5.13, the proof is identical to that of
lemma 5.12, and hence is omitted. 
5.4. Proofs for section 3.5.
Proof of lemma 3.1. Let constants m and M be as defined in (14). As B is continuous on a
compact set, there exists a finite constants
l := min
((s,z),y)∈G
B(s, y, z) and L := max
((s,z),y)∈G
B(s, y, z).
Case I : ρ < 1 < γ. To show condition (SL) of lemma 3.1, we first claim that there exists
a positive constant function w1 such that for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ}θ
>
{
M + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + L
]1−ρ}θ
> w1(s, z). (55)
Evidently, the uniformly strict inequality (55) implies that such a positive constant func-
tion w1 satisfies condition (SL).
To prove our claim that there exists a positive constant function w1 satisfying (55), we
note that, since 0 < 1− ρ < 1 and θ < 0, the following equivalence relation holds{
M + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + L
]1−ρ}θ
> w1 ⇐⇒
w 1θ1 −M
β
 11−ρ − w 11−γ1 − L > 0.
19 For more details of the relevant results of such ψ, please refer to section 3.3.
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Let d := w
1
1−γ
1 and set
ϕ(d) :=
(
d1−ρ −M
β
) 1
1−ρ
− d− L (d > 0),
Showing that (55) holds is equivalent to showing that there exits a positive constant d∗
such that ϕ(d∗) > 0. To show that the latter holds true, one can verify that both the
first and the second derivatives of ϕ on the interval (d, ∞) ⊂ R++ are positive, where
d := [M/(1− β1/ρ)]1/(1−ρ). (We have d > 0, since M > m > 0.) Hence ϕ is concave
upward on (d, ∞). This means that ϕ(d) goes to ∞, as d → ∞, which in turn implies
that there exists a positive constant d∗ > d such that ϕ(d∗) > 0. Letting w1 := (d∗)1−γ
finishes the proof of condition (SL).
Regarding condition (U) of lemma 3.1, we claim first that there is a positive constant
function w2 such that for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[
w
1
1−γ
2 + B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ}θ
6
{
m + β
[
w
1
1−γ
2 + l
]1−ρ}θ
6 w2(s, z). (56)
Evidently, to show the existence of an upper solution w2, it is sufficient to show that
there exists a positive constant function w2 satisfying (56). Further, after some re-
arrangement, we note showing that (56) holds is equivalent to showing that
w 1θ2 −m
β
 11−ρ − w 11−γ2 − l 6 0.
Let w2 := [m/(1− β1/ρ)]θ . Then the left-hand side of the preceding inequality equals β1/ρ1−β1/ρ m
β

1
1−ρ
−
(
m
1− β 1ρ
) 1
1−ρ
− l =
[
β
1
ρ − 1
] ( m
1− β 1ρ
) 1
1−ρ
− l.
Since β ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have β1/ρ− 1 < 0. Further, it follows from m > 0 and
l > 0 that the right-hand side of the above equality is negative. This, in turn, implies
that for w2 defined above, (56) is satisfied, which proves condition (U).
To see that w1 < w2, observe that 0 < d < d∗ and 1− γ < 0 imply 0 < w1 ≡ (d∗)1−γ <
(d)1−γ. In addition, since m 6 M and θ < 0, we have (d)1−γ ≡ [M/(1− β1/ρ)]θ 6
[m/(1− β1/ρ)]θ ≡ w2. We can now conclude that w1 < w2, as desired.
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Case II : 1 < ρ < γ. For this case, the proof is similar. Regarding condition (SL) of
lemma 3.1, we claim first that there exists a positive constant function w1 such that for
fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ}θ
>
{
m + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + L
]1−ρ}θ
> w1(s, z). (57)
The uniformly strict inequality (57) implies that w1 satisfies condition (SL).
To show that there exists a positive constant function w1 satisfying (57), we note that,
since 1− ρ < 0 and θ > 1, the following equivalence relation holds{
m + β
[
w
1
1−γ
1 + L
]1−ρ}θ
> w1 ⇐⇒
w 1θ1 −m
β
 11−ρ − w 11−γ1 − L > 0.
Let d ≡ w
1
1−γ
1 and set
φ(d) :=
(
d1−ρ −m
β
) 1
1−ρ
− d− L (d > 0),
Showing that (57) holds is equivalent to showing that there exits a positive constant
d∗ such that φ(d∗) > 0. To show the latter holds, one can check that both the first
and second derivatives of φ on the interval (d, m1/(1−ρ)) ⊂ R++ are positive, where
d := [m/(1− β1/ρ)]1/(1−ρ). Hence, the graph of φ on (d, m1/(1−ρ)) is concave upward.
Hence φ(d) approaches +∞ as d approaches m1/(1−ρ). It follows that there exists a
positive constant d∗ ∈ (d, m1/(1−ρ)) satisfying φ(d∗) > 0. Finally, for such d∗, letting
w1 ≡ (d∗)1−γ finishes the proof of condition (SL).
Next, to show condition (U), we claim first that there is a positive constant function w2
such that for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[
w
1
1−γ
2 + B(s, y, z)
]1−ρ}θ
6
{
M + β
[
w
1
1−γ
2 + l
]1−ρ}θ
6 w2(s, z). (58)
To show the existence of an upper solution w2, it suffices to show that there exists a
positive constant function w2 satisfying (58), or equivalently,w 1θ2 −M
β
 11−ρ − w 11−γ2 − l 6 0.
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Let w2 := [M/(1− β1/ρ)]θ . Then the left-hand side of the preceding inequality equals
 β1/ρ1−β1/ρ M
β

1
1−ρ
−
(
M
1− β 1ρ
) 1
1−ρ
− l =
[
β
1
ρ − 1
] ( M
1− β 1ρ
) 1
1−ρ
− l < 0.
This, in turn, implies that for such w2 defined above, (58) is naturally satisfied, which is
what we needed to show for condition (U).
Our choices of w1 and w2 satisfy w1 < w2. To see that this is so, observe that w1 ≡
(d∗)1−γ < (d)1−γ ≡ [m/(1− β1/ρ)]θ . Furthermore, it follows from θ > 1 and m 6 M
that [m/(1− β1/ρ)]θ 6 [M/(1− β1/ρ)]θ ≡ w2, from which we conclude that w1 < w2,
as was to be shown. 
5.5. Proofs in section 4. Recalling the definition of the weight function ` in section 4,
the finite `-norm turns the real normed vector space b`mX := { f ∈ mX : f is `-bounded}
into a real Banach space.20 Recalling the definition of Q and the construction of brack-
eting functions w1 and w2 in section 4, we obtain the following results.
Lemma 5.15. If assumption 4.1 holds, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (13) is
isotone and concave in its third argument on V .
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the isotonicity and value-concavity argu-
ments on Q provided in section 3.2.3. 
Lemma 5.16. If assumption 4.1 holds, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (13) pos-
sesses a strict lower solution w1 and an upper solution w2 in the sense that
(SL) there exists an ε > 0 such that Q((s, z), y, w1) > w1(s, z)+ εκ(s, z)θ for all ((s, z), y) ∈
G.
(U) Q((s, z), y, w2) 6 w2(s, z) for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G.
20 The `-norm of f is defined by ‖ f ‖` := sup(s,z)∈S×Z{| f (s, z)|/`(s, z)}. It is worth noting that when the
weight function ` is bounded, the `-norm ‖ · ‖` and the supremum norm ‖ · ‖ are equivalent. Therefore,
the weighted supremum norms become relevant when ` is unbounded.
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Proof of lemma 5.16. Observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Q((s, z), y, w1) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
(L− δ)θ · κ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
>
{
Lκ(s, z) + β
[∫
(L− δ)θ · κ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
>
{
Lκ(s, z) + β(L− δ) [dκ(s, z)]1/θ
}θ
(59)
>
{[
L + β(L− δ)d1/θ
]
· κ(s, z)1/θ
}θ
,
where the first and second inequalities immediately follow from (42) and (44) in as-
sumption 4.1, respectively, while the last one from the fact that κ1/θ 6 κ. Further, with
some rearranging, we obtain
Q((s, z), y, w1) >
[
L− δ+ βLd1/θ + δ(1− βd1/θ)
]θ
κ(s, z) > (L− δ)θκ(s, z),
and the last term is equal to w1(s, z). Similarly, we have
Q((s, z), y, w2) =
{
r(s, y, z) + β
(
M
1− βc1/θ
) [∫
κ(y, z′)θP(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
6
{
Mκ(s, z) + β
(
M
1− βc1/θ
) [
cκ(s, z)θ
]1/θ}θ
=
[
M
1− βc1/θ
]θ
κ(s, z)θ = w2(s, z)
where the inequality follows from (41) and (43) in assumption 4.1. Hence condition (U)
of lemma 5.16 is satisfied.
So far we only show w1 is a lower solution of Q. It remains to prove that it is a strict
lower solution. Observe from (59) that to show condition (SL), it is sufficient to show
that there exists an ε > 0 such that{
Lκ(s, z) + β(L− δ) [dκ(s, z)]1/θ
}θ
> w1(s, z) + εκ(s, z)θ (60)
for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z. To this end, for fixed (s, z) ∈ S× Z, consider{
Lκ(s, z) + β(L− δ) [dκ(s, z)]1/θ
}θ − w1(s, z)
κ(s, z)θ
=
{
L + β(L− δ)d1/θ · κ(s, z)1/θ−1
}θ − (L− δ)θκ(s, z)1−θ
> Lθ − (L− δ)θκ(s, z)1−θ > Lθ − (L− δ)θ > 0
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where the first and second inequalities follow from the facts that κ1/θ−1 > 0 and that
κ1−θ 6 1, respectively. Hence, condition (60) holds when we take ε := Lθ − (L− δ)θ ,
which is what we needed to show for condition (SL). 
Lemma 5.17. If assumption 4.1 holds, then the map ((s, z), y) 7→ Q((s, z), y, vˆ) is continuous
onG whenever vˆ ∈ C .
Proof of lemma 5.17. To see that this is so, pick any vˆ ∈ C . By assumption 4.1, and by
lemma 12.2.20 in Stachurski (2009), we know that (y, z) 7→ ∫ vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′) is con-
tinuous on S × Z. It then follows from the continuity of r that the map ((s, z), y) 7→
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) is continuous onG, as was to be shown. 
Recall that the σ-value operator Tσ on V is defined by
Tσvˆ(s, z) = Q((s, z), σ(s, z), vˆ) =
{
rσ(s, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(σ(s, z), z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z and vˆ ∈ V , where rσ(s, z) := r(s, σ(s, z), z).
Lemma 5.18. If assumption 4.1 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator Tσ is asymptotically
stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.18. First, we show that Tσ is a self-map on V . Fix vˆ in V . Together with
continuity of r, measurabilities of vˆ and σ imply that Tσvˆ is Borel measurable on S× Z.
In addition, since w1 6 vˆ, making use of isotonicity of Q (as shown in lemma 5.15), we
have w1(s, z) 6 Q((s, z), σ(s, z), w1) 6 Q((s, z), σ(s, z), vˆ) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z, which in
turn implies that w1 6 Tσvˆ. A similar argument gives Tσvˆ 6 w2. Therefore, Tσvˆ ∈ V , as
was to be shown.
Now, invoking lemmas 5.15 and 5.16, theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) applies and implies the
stated result. 
Proof of proposition 4.1. This follows immediately from lemma 5.18. 
Given vˆ ∈ V , a policy σ in Σ will be called vˆ-greedy if
σ(s, z) ∈ argmin
y∈Γ(s,z)
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) for all (s, z) ∈ S× Z.
Lemma 5.19. If vˆ ∈ C , then there exists at least one vˆ-greedy policy.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of lemma 5.6. 
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Lemma 5.20. If assumption 4.1 holds, then the operator S is asymptotically stable on C .
Proof of lemma 5.20. By virtue of lemma 5.17, it follows from Berge’s theorem of the min-
imum that, when vˆ is in C , we have
Svˆ(s, z) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
Q((s, z), y, vˆ) = min
y∈Γ(s,z)
{
r(s, y, z) + β
[∫
vˆ(y, z′)P(z, dz′)
]1/θ}θ
and Svˆ is an element of C .
In order to apply Du’s theorem to the Bellman operator S, it suffices to show that
(i) S is isotone and concave on C , and
(ii) Sw1  w1 and Sw2 6 w2.21
Regarding part (i), making use of the result of lemma 5.15, the proof is essentially iden-
tical to that of lemma 5.7. In addition, making use of the result of lemma 5.16, the proof
of part (ii) is also essentially identical to that of lemma 5.7. 
Proof of theorem 4.2. By lemmas 5.18 to 5.20, applying the proof of theorem 5.8 yields the
stated results in theorem 4.2. 
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